THEOLOGY

VOL. LIII MAY, 1950 No. 359

Editorial

THE publication of a new edition of "Hymns A. and M."[1] is a considerable event. It has been the most widely used hymnal of the Church of England and, now that it has been revised with great care and skill, is likely to continue to be so. The new edition, in which the former expedient of Supplements disappears, contains a little over six hundred hymns. About three hundred hymns that were in the Standard Edition have been discarded, some because they had never succeeded in securing favour, others because they ought not to have done so and in the Editors' judgment will anyhow soon cease to retain what favour they still enjoy. But the Editors have had a prudent regard to what worshipping congregations can be expected to take in the way both of accepting what is unfamiliar and of being deprived of old favourites. Thus some regrettably popular Victorian tunes are retained, but nearly always a better alternative is provided as well. The problem of those markedly subjective hymns, expressive of intense or exalted emotion, has been adroitly dealt with by grouping them in a section entitled "Hymns of Personal Devotion," and some that are not put there might have been with advantage. At the same time many fresh hymns of good quality have been added which will strengthen the book a great deal. A hymn book cannot be finally judged until it has been in congregational use for a substantial period of time, but it can be said at once that *Hymns Ancient and Modern Revised* has every prospect not only of becoming as popular as its predecessors, but, what is more important, of doing what a hymn book ought to do for the Church.

* * * * *

The Church of Rome has a way of disowning, or at least of clouding the credentials of, its most effective apologists. No one in our time has put forward a more attractive and persuasive description of Roman Catholicism than Professor Karl Adam in his book *The Spirit of Catholicism.* We have recently received the French translation of a book of his on Christian reunion.[2] Not only does he show a warm and patently sincere sympathy with Protestants, but his appreciation of the personality and witness of Luther is much more positive and profound than that of many Protestants themselves.

[1] *Hymns Ancient and Modern Revised.* Full Music size, 9s. 6d. Seven other sizes, both with words only and with music, will be published during the course of this year. Full particulars concerning sizes, prices, grants, etc., may be had from William Clowes and Sons, Ltd, Little New Street, London, E.C.4.

[2] *Vers l'Unité Chrétienne du point de vue catholique* (Aubier, Paris).

Nor have we read a more candid confession by a Roman Catholic of the errors and corruptions of the medieval Church. While Professor Adam does not modify the hard substance of the Roman claims, he goes out of his way to emphasize the points of agreement between Protestants and Catholics and their need of one another. He looks forward to a union of churches rather than to the submission of individuals to the papacy. If such a union is realized one day, there will be, he says, giving and receiving on both sides.

There is little of this eirenic and winning spirit in the instructions on the ecumenical movement that the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office has now issued.[1] Some satisfaction can no doubt be derived from the fact that it no longer imposes a complete ban on common prayer at meetings attended by Roman Catholics and other Christians. But the rigid supervision and control which the Vatican is now going to exercise over those of its theologians, who are permitted[2] to join in conversations with theologians of other communions, are calculated to discourage, if not to stop, the spontaneous and informal meetings which have been taking place, and which, it has been hoped, might be a result in this country of the recent correspondence in *The Times* newspaper. In future, "the bishops themselves will prescribe what is or is not to be done, and they will see to it that all obey. They should be on their guard against those who under false pretexts stress the points on which we agree rather than those on which we disagree. . . . The bishops will pay special attention to the manner in which the story of the Reformation is presented and will take a firm stand against any exaggeration of shortcomings on the Catholic side coupled with a glossing over of the Reformers' errors." Local ordinaries are to send regular reports to Rome about any meetings that take place, with information about the questions discussed, the names of those present, and the speakers on both sides. As regards publications, the regulations of the Canon Law about censorship and the prohibition of books are to be strictly enforced. It is perhaps as well that Protestants should receive this renewed notification about the character of the system to which they are being invited to submit. A police church has not much to learn from the Police State.

[1] For the full text see *The Tablet*, March 4, 1950.

[2] "For discussions between Catholic and non-Catholic theologians only priests are to be sent and these must have proved their fitness for such tasks by their knowledge of theology and by their close adherence to the Church's principles in this matter."

The Basis of Church Authority

A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF ANGLICAN OPINION IN THE EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

When the political and religious upheavals of the mid-sixteenth century had subsided, and when the firm establishment of Elizabeth upon the throne seemed to guarantee the permanence of the Anglican reformation, the defence of the English Church became less a matter of politics than apologetics. The defence of doctrine, to those engaged in it, seemed a straightforward task. Biblical texts and patristic quotations were easily come by; and so confident were the Anglicans of their strength that they were seldom content with merely defensive measures, but took every opportunity of attack. "Where was your religion before Luther?" was a question put to Sir Henry Wotton in Rome. "It was then," he replied, "where yours is not now, in God's written word." But the defence of authority was another matter. For on all hands the divine origin of the Church was admitted, and both Rome and Geneva deduced from this a divine and independent authority which, at least so far as statute law and current practice went, could with difficulty (if at all) be discerned in the Church of England. The only course left open was to sanctify that royal supremacy from which escape seemed impossible, and which was, indeed, the only earthly defence left to the Church. With the rapid spread of the doctrine of divine right of kings in the early seventeenth century this process of "sanctification" became easier; and the identification of Church and State—admitted by Hooker as a fact—came, under the early Stuarts, to be regarded almost as part of the divine law.[1] The civil war and the interregnum naturally strengthened the conception of the divinely appointed monarch as the protector and governor of the Church; and though the restoration divines were less extravagant in their exaltation of the royal prerogative in matters of religion than Laud had been, they felt no temptation to minimize or explain away the supremacy of the Crown, but continued to use it in defence of their position against Romanists and puritans alike. The accession of James II produced some uneasiness, but (at least among high churchmen, who had always been strongest for the royal prerogative) no reconsideration of the fundamental relations between Church and Crown. The protest of the seven bishops against the declaration of indulgence was based on its alleged violation of the Constitution, not on the ground that it invaded the divine rights of the Church—their protest belongs to the realm not of ecclesiastical but of civil politics. When the rights of the Church were interfered with, as in the suspension of the Bishop of London from the exercise of his spiritual functions and in the intrusion of papists at Oxford, the

[1] See, *e.g.*, G. Davis, *The Early Stuarts* (Oxford, 1938), p. 69.

bishops appeared to accept these as unfortunate, but legitimate, exertions of the royal supremacy. Nor is this acquiescence surprising; for if they denied the royal supremacy what had they to put in its place?

If the reign of James II had continued, if the privileges of the Church had been progressively curtailed and her revenues diverted, the bishops might have been forced to attempt some interpretation of royal supremacy which would have enabled the Church to rest upon her own intrinsic authority. But the revolution came hard upon them, the question of Church and Church authority could not be considered until the points of conscience raised by the transference of the Crown had been settled. Even then—even when those who had sacrificed their benefices to their consciences stood out against those who had been able to save both—the primary question at issue was political, not ecclesiastical, for if the revolution settlement was legitimate, if William and Mary could, *de jure*, exercise royal power as fully as James II had done, then the question of the royal supremacy over the Church was not involved, or at least it stood exactly where it had stood before the revolution, except that a sovereign not in communion with the established Church had been replaced by a king and queen who were. As Professor Sykes has pointed out,[1] the question of "lay deprivation," of which the non-jurors later made so much, was not originally involved at all—the question was not, "Can the civil power deprive a bishop?" but, "Is the civil power legitimately lodged in William and Mary?" Because the non-jurors answered the second question in the negative they had not really to face the first at all (or rather, they had refused to face it in the reign of James II, when Bishop Compton of London was suspended). Hoadly stresses the point in his *Preservative*. The denial of the right of the civil power to deprive is, he says, "a new-invented engine . . . never thought of nor believed, at the time of their deprivation, by those very bishops, in whose cause it was so much pleaded; and, if we may judge by what they had solemnly declared, probably abhorred by them. All the argument which they could make use of in this case was the want of authority in the civil power then in possession; but not the want of authority in the civil power, supposing it to be the rightful power."[2] But though the non-jurors were on very weak ground, or at least on ground which it was hard for them to occupy consistently, the revolution, quite apart from the question of lay deprivation which took up so much space in the subsequent controversy, compelled churchmen of all shades of opinion to reconsider the basis of church authority. For it was impossible to maintain that the divine right of James II had passed legitimately to his son-in-law. Whatever claims Mary might have by descent, William's claim was distinctly a parliamentary one. But the consequences of making the royal supremacy over

[1] N. Sykes, *Church and State in England in the Eighteenth Century*, pp. 286-7, 289.

[2] B. Hoadly, *A Preservative against the Principles and Practices of the Non-jurors, both in Church and State* (4th ed., 1717), p. 29.

the Church a parliamentary supremacy were unpalatable to most churchmen. Burnet sums up the position:[1]

> It has passed generally among the clergy, that ecclesiastical matters could only be judged by persons deriving their power immediately from God: and as the clergy have their commission from him, so it was a received doctrine, that the king had his power likewise from God, and that therefore the Church was to be governed by the king and the Convocation. . . . It could never be thought that parliaments were *de jure divino*; so it was a consequence suitable to their principles, who put our whole ecclesiastical constitution on the bottom of a divine right, to shut this within the hands of those who they believed acted by a divine commission.

It was this question of a parliamentary supremacy, not the deprivation of the non-jurors, which compelled reconsideration of the relationship of Church and State. In a sense, the controversy to which this led was a barren one. It resulted first in the reassembly of the convocations and then in their virtual suppression; but in practice the relations of Church and State remained unchanged, or were affected only by the gradual diminution of the personal authority of the sovereign in ecclesiastical as in political matters. Yet, barren as the controversy may appear, it is worth surveying. The question at issue is of perennial interest, the protagonists were, many of them, men of outstanding importance, and their writings illuminate and illustrate the mental outlook of the eighteenth century.[2]

Basically, the whole subject matter of the controversy may be reduced to this: "How can the divine authority claimed for the Church be reconciled with the actual subordination of Church to State which prevails in England; where the rulers of the Church are appointed by the civil government and may even be deprived of spiritual jurisdiction on political grounds; where the Church cannot call synods without royal authority, nor the synods, when assembled, transact business without the same authority?"

To this question three different answers were put forward. The first and simplest was that the Church had in fact no divine authority at all. This is most clearly and strongly expressed by Bishop Hoadly. In his famous sermon, *The Nature of the Kingdom, or Church, of Christ*, he declared that Christ had "left behind Him no visible human authority; no vicegerents who can be said properly to supply His place; no interpreters, upon whom His subjects are absolutely to depend; no judges over the consciences or religion of

[1] Gilbert Burnet, *Reflections on a Book entitled, The Rights . . . of an English Convocation, Stated and Vindicated* (London, 1700), p. 7.

[2] It must be made clear that this paper is concerned less with the actual state of affairs than with the interpretations of it. Professor Sykes has said that much of the controversy is irrelevant (*op. cit.*, p. 294). But though it is true that many of the arguments put forward bore little relation to the facts, they represent the urgent desire of churchmen to find some theory by which to justify their practice. Though their salvo of the divine right of the Church had little meaning in the eighteenth century it has not proved irrelevant in the later history of Anglicanism.

his people."[1] It was this sermon which gave rise to the "Bangorian controversy," in which the main point at issue, the nature of the Church and of church authority, was so frequently lost sight of, and the natural taste of the controversialist for personal reflections so frequently indulged, that the scores of pamphlets which it produced add little or nothing to the support of the main thesis which Hoadly laid down; while almost all that could be said in opposition is concentrated in William Law's *Three Letters to the Bishop of Bangor.*

Hoadly's sermon was preached in 1717. In the previous year he had dealt with the question at greater length in his *Preservative against the Principles and Practices of the Non-jurors both in Church and State,* for by this time the non-jurors had passed far beyond the question of deprivation and had launched out into a boundless sea of controversy. In both these works Hoadly adopts the same method of argument; though he makes incidental appeals to law and precedent he works from general principles, founded upon Scripture or upon reason. So he writes, "The gospel hath not made the least alteration, either in the pretensions, or rights, of civil governments"; and again, "As God approves of everything necessary to civil government, it is necessarily implied in that, that he approves of no powers, or privileges, in any persons upon earth, which are in such sense independent upon it, as to be inconsistent with it."[2] It was probably because the results at which he aimed were so sweeping, and, if accepted, cut the ground so completely from beneath the feet of the high church clergy, that Hoadly was assailed with such vigour and such bitterness.

But others had already reached similar conclusions by methods which, if more pedestrian, were likely to be more dangerous. Hoadly appealed to Scripture and reason; William Wake, in his *Authority of Christian Princes Asserted,*[3] had appealed to the laws of England. Wake's purpose was more narrowly limited than Hoadly's. His main concern was to answer the claim put forward by Atterbury on behalf of the English convocations.[4] He set out to show that in fact since the time of the Roman emperors Christian princes, and in particular the kings of England, had exercised control over ecclesiastical assemblies; and that by the law and custom of the English Constitution the Convocations were subject to the king, who alone could summon them, authorize them to meet, give them licence to proceed to business, and prescribe what that business should be. But though Wake's purpose was limited he could not altogether

---

[1] Benjamin Hoadly, *The Nature of the Kingdom, or Church, of Christ. A Sermon preached before the king . . . on Sunday, March 31, 1717* (9th ed., London, 1717), p. 11.

[2] B. Hoadly, *Preservative,* pp. 30, 37. The argument in the second passage was used, *mutatis mutandis,* by writers on the other side.

[3] William Wake, *The Authority of Christian Princes over their Ecclesiastical Synods Asserted . . .,* London, 1697.

[4] In *A Letter to a Convocation Man* (London, 1697). This is sometimes attributed to Sir Bartholomew Shower; for Atterbury's authorship see N. Sykes, *Edmund Gibson,* p. 26, *n.* 2.

avoid the basic principles involved. His doctrine does not strike so deeply at the existence of the Church as does Hoadly's, but it is no less destructive of independent church authority:[1]

> . . . though I will not enter upon a new subject, yet I must needs say, I am by no means satisfied, that the Church has either command, or authority from God, to assemble synods.

And again:

> The foundation of synods, in the Church, is (in my apprehension) the same, as of councils in the State. The necessities of the Church, when it began to be enlarged, first brought in the one, as those of the commonwealth did the other. And therefore, when men are incorporated into societies, as well for the service of God, and the salvation of their souls, as for their civil peace, and security, these assemblies are to be as much subject to the laws of the society, and to be regulated by them, as any other public assemblies, of what kind soever, are. Nor has the Church any inherent divine right, to set it at liberty, from being concluded by such rules, as the governing part of every society shall prescribe to it, as to this matter. . . .

There is some evidence that Wake later modified this extreme opinion. Charles Leslie writes, in 1701, "Dr K[ennet] asserts . . . that Dr Wake and his friends are for the Church having inherent rights to Convocations."[2] But this may mean no more than what he had admitted from the beginning, "that a Convocation may be said to be essential to our constitution."[3] Wake's attitude was that of a lawyer. He could not find the divine origin of the Church of England asserted in either the common or the statute law and he derived her constitution from no higher source.

It was natural enough for politicians and lawyers to accept these views. Wake's arguments on behalf of the civil power helped to bring him to the see of Canterbury; George I ordered Hoadly's sermon to be printed, and protected him from the anger of the lower house of Convocation by proroguing it. But to the bulk of the clergy, even if they were whigs in politics, such views on the nature of the Church were distasteful. Even if Wake's exposition of the legal position was sound, did it necessarily imply the truth of Hoadly's principles? Was it not possible to reconcile the existing state of affairs with the Church's claim to divine right?

Such a reconciliation (or an attempt at it) provides the second answer to the basic question. There are two elements in this process of reconciliation. In the first place, it is admitted that the authority of the Church (in effect, that of the bishops) is of divine origin, but that the right to exercise this authority depends upon the civil power. There are here considerable variations of interpretation. Some hold that the bishop derives from the civil power nothing but a "coactive" authority, by which he can use civil sanctions in support

[1] W. Wake, *The Authority of Christian Princes* (London, 1697), pp. 265, 265-6.
[2] Charles Leslie, *The Case of the Regale* (ed. 1701) in *Works* (London, 1832), iii, 257.
[3] W. Wake, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

of the spiritual jurisdiction which he exercises by independent right. Hoadly had referred rather contemptuously to this "notion of something . . . which the supreme power cannot take away, because it neither could, nor did, give it" and had then asserted the right of the government to prevent ecclesiastics from exercising any of their functions anywhere within its dominions.[1] It is interesting to compare this assertion with Swift's on the same subject. Swift also admits the power of the civil authorities in this respect, but in such terms as imply that the exercise of the power is illegitimate and tyrannical. They can prevent the clergy, he says, "from performing any ecclesiastical office, as they may from eating, drinking and sleeping."[2] Swift nowhere worked out in detail this principle of distinguishing between the authority of the Church and the liberty of exercising that authority, and he used it not so much to justify, as to explain, the ecclesiastical position in England. One thing he asserted strongly—the divine origin of the Church: ". . . the Church of England is no creature of the civil power, either as to its polity or its doctrines. The fundamentals of both were deduced from Christ and His apostles."[3] But he was not prepared to admit that the deprivations carried out at the revolution were an infringement of the Church's spiritual authority. He took the common-sense view that the bulk of the nation and of the Church having accepted the change, the minority must make what terms they could with their consciences or with the government.

But this distinction, though useful, was not in itself a sufficient answer to all difficulties. Indeed, the distinction was, at least in one sense, admitted by the non-jurors themselves. Kettlewell wrote:[4]

> In Christian kingdoms the Church is incorporated into the State, and by the benefit of this incorporation bishops and pastors have their spiritual ministrations backed with secular effects and censures. All these . . . are the gifts of the State. . . . And what the State gives, the State when it sees cause may deprive them of.

But not only had the non-juring bishops been prevented from exercising the spiritual jurisdiction which they claimed independently of the State; the whole Church of England was restricted and hampered in the exercise of such jurisdiction by limitations imposed by the civil power.[5] How could this be justified, or at least so explained as to clear the Church from the charge of Erastianism? Here the second part of the reconciliation enters, the theory of an alliance

---

[1] B. Hoadly, *Preservative*, p. 26.

[2] J. Swift, *Remarks* (on Tyndal's *Rights of the Christian Church*) in *Prose Works* (ed. H. Davis), ii, 77.

[3] *Ibid.*, ii, 79. Swift left these *Remarks* in an unfinished condition, but they reveal something of his thought on the relations of Church and State.

[4] J. Kettlewell, *Of Christian Communion*, Pt. ii, ch. i, quoted in N. Sykes, *Church and State*, p. 289.

[5] For the effect of these restrictions on the attempt to provide a bishop for the North American colonists see C. F. Pascoe, *Two Hundred Years of the S.P.G.*, pp. 743-51, and A. L. Cross, *The American Colonies and the Anglican Episcopate*.

between Church and State. It is loosely sketched by Swift, who places its origin in the period at which the State became Christian and consequently accepted the constitution and laws of the Church as fundamental and unalterable.[1] In putting forward this theory Swift was, as always, producing an *ad hoc* argument to meet a particular problem or situation. He was not concerned with its implications nor with any difficulties of interpretation that might arise. This theory of a compact was, of course, a common enough one, and Swift's use of it as a protection for the Church not merely, nor mainly, against the State, but against the critics of the establishment, was elaborated by William Warburton in his *Alliance between Church and State.*

The book was first published in 1736, and almost thirty years later Warburton explained the motives which he had in mind.[2] The supporters of the revolution settlement had, he says, attacked the Church so bitterly "that under the confessed design of confuting and decrying the usurpations of a popish hierarchy, they virtually deprived the Church of every power and privilege, which, as a simple society, she had a claim to." It was in "this disastrous state of things" that Warburton undertook his work on the Church.

> My purpose, I am not ashamed to own, was to repel the cruel inroads made upon its rights and privileges; but, I thank God, on honester principles than those which have been employed to prop up, with Gothic buttresses, a Jacobite or high church hierarchy. . . . I made the Church neither a slave nor a tyrant (and under one or other of these ideas of it, almost all men had now taken party) . . . .

Superficially, Warburton might appear to have effected a satisfactory reconciliation of the divine right of the Church with the supremacy of the civil magistrate in ecclesiastical affairs, as then exercised in England. But there was a fundamental weakness in his position. The alliance as he described it necessitated such a degree of civil supremacy in ecclesiastical affairs as would involve the virtual dissolution of the Church as a society.[3]

This criticism of the "contract" theory in general had been very strongly put by the non-juror Charles Leslie, writing a generation or so before the publication of Warburton's book:[4]

> But whereas no society can subsist without meeting, and consulting of their affairs, and giving orders, as occasion shall require; if one society cannot meet or convene together, without the leave and authority of the other; then is that society, in a manner, dissolved, and subsists precariously upon the mere will and pleasure of the other.

---

[1] J. Swift, *Remarks*, in *Prose Works*, ii, 77.

[2] W. Warburton, *The Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated*, dedication of vols. iv, v, vi of ed. of 1765 in *Works* (ed. 1811), iv, 3, 6. For an exposition of Warburton's views see N. Sykes, *Church and State*, A. H. Evans, *Warburton and the Warburtonians*.

[3] See especially *The Alliance of Church and State*, in *Works* (ed. 1811), vii, 153 ff.

[4] Charles Leslie, *The Case of the Regale*, in *Works* (ed. 1832), iii, 290.

Leslie was the most vigorous exponent of a third answer to the question. Like Swift and Warburton, he and the writers who may be grouped with him asserted the principle of the independent divine origin of the Church. But their approach to the problem was different; for they pushed this principle to what seemed to them its logical conclusion. Instead of accepting the situation, and asking, "How can this be reconciled with the divine origin of the Church?," they started from the divine origin of the Church, and asked, "How far does the existing constitutional position square with this?" Leslie professed to find that the law of the land was quite compatible with the full liberty of the Church and that there need be no conflict between them, that "the sacred and civil powers were like two parallel lines, which can never meet or interfere; for these two authorities lie in two distinct channels. . . ." But he had to face the fact that his own interpretation of the legal position was not generally accepted and that the act of submission of the clergy might mean a great deal more than he was willing to admit. And here he comes into the open and states his case unequivocally. He will, if necessary, defy the power of parliament. Having expounded the view of his opponents, that the act of submission has deprived the bishops of the right to exercise spiritual jurisdiction, except by royal permission, and that if they do so they will incur the penalty of *præmunire*, he goes on:[1]

> . . . he has not yet been christened, or has forgot it, who would have the least hesitation or scruple to damn the act (I mean if taken in this sense) to the place from whence it came, if there were ten thousand other Acts of Parliament pinned to the back of it! It is a maxim in our law, that an Act of Parliament contrary to the law of God is void: and if this be not contrary, then Christ left no Church upon earth, appointed no shepherds to feed His flock, or gave them not sufficient authority to do it!

William Law follows the same general line. His arguments are not so vigorous, nor are his conclusions so emphatically expressed; but he is no less insistent upon the reality of church authority:[2]

> This authority does not arise from any human laws, or the power which any men in any station soever have over others, but is the authority of God, who has instituted this Church, in order to oblige all men to enter into it.

The theory put forward by Leslie and Law made directly for the establishment of an *imperium in imperio*, in spite of Leslie's efforts

---

[1] C. Leslie, *op. cit.*, iii, 291, 273.
Not many constitutional lawyers of his own day would have supported Leslie's limitation upon the sovereignty of parliament, at least in such an uncompromising form. "In *Day* v. *Savage* (1614) . . . it is said, 'Even an Act of Parliament made against natural equity . . . is void in itself. . . .' But this doctrine seems never to have been applied in any court, and since the seventeenth century there has been scarcely a suggestion of the kind" (D. L. Keir and F. H. Lawson, *Cases in Constitutional Law*, 3rd ed., p. 2). A similar opinion is expressed by A. V. Dicey (*The Law of the Constitution*, 3rd ed., pp. 58-60). But *cf.* H. H. L. Bellot, "The Rule of Law," in *Quarterly Review*, April, 1926.

[2] William Law, *Three Letters to the Bishop of Bangor* (ed. Nash and Gore, 1893), p. 309.

to prove the contrary;[1] and the remoteness of their arguments from reality is no doubt due, in part at least, to the irresponsibility of their position. They might precipitate a conflict between Church and State and yet (being non-jurors) stand aside as spectators. Atterbury, who was equally strong for the rights of the Church, clearly felt the need for caution, and though he hints at the possibility of a divergence between ecclesiastical law and "temporal law" he does not develop the theme.[2] Similarly, Francis Hare, having laid it down that "as the Church is a society, whatever is essential to a society, must be so to the Church," goes on to express his satisfaction with the security the Church of England enjoyed under George I, "a prince, who has very lately declared he has its honour and security near at heart," and Archbishop Wake, "a primate, who governs in the meekness of wisdom, and can be zealous for the truth without breathing persecution."[3]

This last phrase reminds us of a peculiar difficulty facing those who claimed that the Church had retained an independent authority, even after her alliance with the State. What was the answer to the claim that "reformation" from the Church of England could be justified on the same grounds as "reformation" from the Church of Rome? Hoadly seized upon this difficulty. If the arguments of his adversaries are to be accepted

> I beg to know, how can the reformation itself . . . be justified, which was founded upon the right of Christians to have recourse to the gospel for themselves; and to throw off all that church authority which assumes a right of obliging them to the Romish communion; and a right superior to their own private judgments and consciences?

And he goes on to query the position of the Church of England, "a thousand panegyrics upon its beauty and excellency are of small importance, if the very ground it stands upon be declared to be rotten and unsound." His conclusion from this is that his own principles "cannot otherwise be opposed or contradicted, but by reviving such claims as destroy that very foundation [of the Church of England] itself."[4] Law's answer to this is appropriate enough to the controversy between himself and Hoadly, but it is little more than an *argumentum ad hominem*: if Hoadly can justify the revolution of 1688-9 and yet recognize the authority of George I, he should have no difficulty in justifying the reformation, and yet recognizing the authority of the Church of England in his own day.[5]

Though this reasoning comes well enough from Law and is in keeping with the genius of the Church of England, it is logically incomplete, and would be of little value in any effort to settle the quarrel between Canterbury and Rome over jurisdiction. But this,

---

[1] C. Leslie, *op. cit.*, iii, 290.

[2] F. Atterbury, *The Rights . . . of an English Convocation*, p. 98.

[3] Francis Hare, *Church Authority Vindicated* (4th ed., 1720), pp. 25, 42.

[4] B. Hoadly, *An answer to the representation drawn up by the committee of the lower house of convocation* (1718), pp. 117-8, 119

[5] W. Law, *op. cit.*, pp. 222 ff.

after all, was not the particular aspect of the problem of ecclesiastical polity with which eighteenth-century churchmen were most deeply concerned. Most of those who wanted freedom of action wanted it in order to deal with another set of enemies, the deists; and when this freedom was denied them they set to work to meet the deists on their own ground and with their own weapons. The Church of England in the eighteenth century almost abandoned the effort to become, in fact, a self-governing community; instead, she devoted herself, with substantial success. to the task of Christian apologetics.

J. C. Beckett.

The Place of Vocation in Christian Ethics

It is perhaps safe to say that for the most part the idea of vocation has had a place, and often a secure place, in the Christian consciousness in general; but it may well be doubted whether it has always received adequate recognition and treatment at the hands of those whose task it was to give a systematic exposition of the Christian ethic. It is of course true that under the Latin form of the word the idea of vocation has had a long innings in theological thought, for the *vocatio* was the "high calling of God in Christ Jesus," that is to say, the Christian calling shared by all believers. In this sense of the word, it is clear, our vocation is a common vocation, it is a shared vocation; and *vocatio* represents the universal element in all Christian vocations. This, moreover, is an inalienable aspect of all Christian vocation, for, whatever else it is, "it is our Father's good pleasure to give us the kingdom" and "this is the work of God that we believe on him whom he hath sent." Consequently, no comprehensive consideration of the subject is possible which does not set this universal element in the central place. God's purpose does not reveal itself only in secret to this man and the other; it also openly declares itself, and goes out graciously to fulfil itself, in Jesus Christ His Son. Whatever else may be included in our Christian vocation, it is at any rate a call to a place in God's everlasting kingdom and to life now characterized by faith and hope and love.

If it is right, however, that the universal element, the *vocatio*, should occupy the central place in the picture, it is wrong that Christian thought should ignore, or even that it should pass lightly over, the variable element, that element in the total concept which differs from this individual to the other and which indeed is more readily suggested by the English form of the word, "vocation." Yet that is exactly what has happened. The idea of vocation as we ordinarily understand it—the idea, that is to say, that a man's life-work has been chosen for him and is that to which he is called—is in origin an essentially religious idea; but the fact remains that so

far as the systematic exposition of religious thinking is concerned it has to a large extent fallen between two stools. On the one hand, although the idea has certainly found a prominent place in theology, it is, rightly enough, the universal element which has done so, the *vocatio* or our calling in Christ, and the other aspect has been completely overshadowed by that. In Christian ethics, on the other hand, the latter, although here it should have been at home, has all too frequently been absent, and the discipline has proceeded without one of its leading ideas. How has that been possible? The answer is that it has been made possible by the portrayal of the Christian life as a succession of duties or as an accumulation of virtues and graces or as both. Thus, in the scholasticism of the middle ages, we are told by Newman Smyth, "the natural virtues, according to Aristotle or Plato, were clumsily joined to the supernatural graces according to Thomas Aquinas."[1]

The truth is that Christian ethics has a difficult course to steer between two opposite dangers, for on the one side it is apt to be overshadowed by dogmatics and appear as a bare appendix to the latter, while on the other it may easily lose its distinctive point of view amid the varied details of life and conduct. Thus for long, under the shadow of dogmatic tasks, ethics failed completely to appear; and then, when it did come into view, it wore the meagre aspect of a system of rules and regulations for the exercise of ecclesiastical authority, and so concentrated on matters of less than first importance to the genuine task of Christian ethics. On the other hand, in too great independence of its theological basis, Christian ethics has sometimes presented an unwieldy and unsystematic appearance. "Ethical inquiry," says A. B. D. Alexander,[2] "if it has no dogmatic basis, loses scientific value and sinks into a mere enumeration of duties." Since that is so, the first-rate importance of the total concept of vocation is at once evident. It is the natural connecting link between dogmatics and ethics. On the one side, it opens a door into the very centre of theological teaching, while, on the other, it indicates the varied task of Christian discipleship.

The truth of the Gospel is obscured, then, if one or other of two things is allowed to happen. It is obscured if it is not adequately recognized that our Christian vocation is primarily to receive the gift of God and that therefore it is one vocation for all, that there is "one hope of our calling, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all and through all and in us all." But the truth is also obscured if justice is not done to the fact that the gift and the calling come upon men, not in abstraction from the context of mortal life, but here and now, as they are, with their present opportunities of service, in their present circumstances, with their existing capacities and talents, and therefore that they have to work out their own salvation in different spheres and settings. St Paul allows this when, having dwelt upon the unity of the

[1] *Christian Ethics* (3rd ed.), p. 8.
[2] *Christianity and Ethics*, p. 25.

Christian vocation, he goes on to insist that some are called to be apostles; some, prophets; some, evangelists; some, pastors and teachers; and so on. Yet the truth is broader even than that. To restrict oneself to such a statement of the case would not only be in all probability to contradict the intention of St Paul himself, but, more important still, it would also indicate an imperfect apprehension of the mind of Jesus Christ, who not only set His disciples aside for their special tasks, but also enjoined others to continue in their sphere, to go their way, having been made whole by faith.

It is of course true that, once established, Christian ethics could not be content with any discharge of its important task which amounted to no more than a bare enumeration of different duties, or even a classification of various virtues. The Christian life, whatever else it might be, was always a life characterized by a certain unity and wholeness and, consequently, Christian ethics could not adequately portray that life if it did not to some extent bring into view its characteristic unity. Even in the middle ages the life of the Christian was very much more than a number of supernatural graces superimposed upon a plurality of natural virtues, although, admittedly, this "something more" might be barely perceptible and probably hard to define. None the less, Christian ethics was, and still is, committed to the search for this unifying factor; and there are in principle two opposite directions in which it might look for it, in the *form* of the Christian life and in its *content*.

By the former is intended chiefly the portrayal of the Christian life, not in terms of any peculiar quality of its concrete behaviour, but as a life lived in obedience to the will of God. Obviously, moreover, this is, so far as it goes, a perfectly true characterization, for no life can claim to be Christian which does not accept God's will as law. On the other hand, it is as it stands an inadequate characterization which fails entirely to take into account the insight of the Christian consciousness into the nature of the requirements which God lays upon His children, an insight which may well be continuous with that of the natural conscience. Consequently, as purporting to be not only the truth but the whole truth, this theory is sheer nominalism and raises more problems than it solves. Thus, for example, it implies that always our knowledge that God has commanded a certain kind of act is logically prior to our knowledge that such an act is right, and therefore it leads to the perplexing query how in that case we ever come to recognize God's will.

The main alternative to this general line of inquiry is to seek for the unifying factor of the Christian life in its content rather than in its form; and here perhaps the attempt is most often made to present a unified view of the Christian ethic under the dominating idea of love. But if faith without love is nothing, love without faith is always in danger of becoming either a vague abstraction or an unprincipled sentimentality. Certainly, love is of the very essence of the Christian life, but how shall we love unless God Himself shall teach us? Our deficiency, moreover, is not one of motive-power alone, but also of insight. The argument may be illustrated by

reference to Christ's parable of the Good Samaritan. The moral of this tale is often taken to be the point that all men are brothers; but, although doubtless that is included, the lesson is fuller than that. It is that our neighbour is our brother as he confronts us on the path of life, in his need, and it is our vocation, part of our calling, to meet the immediate challenge of his distress. The encounter, the crossing of the two different lines of life, is essential to the explanation of neighbourliness; the demand of the present situation is always much fuller than "the principle of love" might give us to expect; and the leading of the Spirit is an essential part of love's obedience. It is certainly true that the Christian life is a life of love, but it is equally the case that that is not the whole truth of the matter. Its requirements cannot be comprehended beforehand in any principle descriptive of its content; and this indeed seems to have been Christ's ultimate objection to Peter's desire when he inquired, "How oft shall my brother sin against me and I forgive him? Till seven times?" Fundamentally, it was not that Peter wished to *reduce* his Christian duty, but rather that he wanted to comprehend it in its entirety at one sweep, to have the knowledge of it complete leaving only its practical discharge for the future.

If, then, the idea of obedience to God and that of love are each inadequate to express the task of Christian discipleship, may it not be that the idea of vocation more truly meets the case? It is the purpose of this paper to suggest an affirmative answer to this question, and several considerations combine to support this thesis—namely, that the idea of vocation, though often neglected, is none the less the central concept of Christian ethics.

It is noteworthy that the other two ideas to which reference has been made, the idea of obedience to God and that of love, were rejected not at all on the ground that they were in themselves false and misleading, but rather on the ground that, while both principles were true so far as they went, each was inadequate as a representation of the whole truth; and, consequently, it remains possible that the idea of vocation, which contrives to hold both of the others together, may more accurately describe the life of the Christian, for the concept of vocation does carry with it a double suggestion—namely, a suggestion of *something given and particular, not completely determined by general principle,* and yet of *something to the determination of which a consideration of general principles is not entirely irrelevant.* Moreover, these two ideas are held together in organic unity, for the Christian life is portrayed as a life of love in obedience to God's will, as, in other words, *the fulfilment of a divine purpose which in apprehension and appreciation we human beings only imperfectly share.* Thus justice is done both to the Christian's insight into the nature of the divine requirement and at the same time to the limitations of that insight; and room is left for the important fact that it is as a man acts by the light he has that he gains more light. In other words, this account of the matter has the great advantage of recognizing both that love is the fulfilment of the law and that none the less the practice of love is never merely

the application to concrete situations of a preconceived principle but is always potentially a fresh revelation of God's will and also of God's grace.

Further, if Christian life is conceived in this way it is conceived in terms broad enough to comprehend that large section of the moral life which is concerned with the routine duties of my station, which, as duties arising from a realized ideal, F. H. Bradley distinguished from other duties that might arise from an unrealized ideal.[1] What is in mind here are those everyday humdrum duties which make up the greater part of a man's life and which yet do not seem to demand love for their performance, which indeed follow for the most part such a rigid pattern that they do not permit love.

What can Christian ethics say of such duties? The nominalist might say that they must be performed blindly just because they are commanded, but then are we slaves and not sons. The protagonist of love as the ultimate principle of morality may either hold that this routine section of life is not moral and so portray it as a mere marking-time for the kingdom of heaven, or else he may insist on regarding it sentimentally as despite all appearances an expression of love, although such a course can hardly carry any solid conviction. It remains to be seen therefore whether after all the emphasis upon the idea of vocation fares any better in this matter; and to this the answer is, surely, that it does, in that if the sphere of routine duty cannot plausibly be regarded as involving a performance of love towards men, it can be regarded and ought to be regarded as involving a performance of love and gratitude to God, who has placed us where we are, giving us the burden and privilege of life. In this respect it is perhaps comparable to the anointing of Jesus by the unknown woman, although in other respects the likeness fails, for the Christian performance of routine duty is not only a performance of love and gratitude to God, but being that is also a reflection of God's love for all His children in giving them not only life but the system of life which they have inherited and, perhaps, been enabled to amend. This, it clearly seems, is an ethical affirmation upon which emphasis is required at the present time over against a world for whose soul Communism is actively competing. Too often the Christian Church has been aware of nothing comparable to the significance with which Communist dogma has been able to endow the everyday economic activities of men; and yet in this way, and, as it would seem, only in this way, can the routine sphere of duty be brought into effective relationship with love, not indeed a love which is completely comprehensible by sinful men, but the divine love whose ways they only imperfectly understand. This does not mean, of course, that the Christian ethic is committed to the defence of the *status quo* or, for that matter, of any particular social system; but, on the other hand, neither is it committed to the utter and complete rejection of any social system. The social effect of Christian faith is neither re-

[1] *Cf. Ethical Studies* (2nd ed.), pp. 219 ff.

actionary nor revolutionary. Every social system, by virtue of man's participation in it, is imperfect, some more than others; but every social system is at the same time an expression, more or less hindered and thwarted, of God's love and providence, and the Christian's duty is to maintain and improve it, although once again that is true only in general and here also a man's precise duty cannot be infallibly predetermined.

Now, the conception of a divine purpose which men only imperfectly apprehend and share has room for the idea of the progressive realization of an ideal alongside the idea that each stage in the process, although it may fall short of the ideal end, may none the less impose its own categorical duties and obligations. If, on the other hand, the purpose is conceived either as purely divine (nominalism) or as completely comprehensible to humanity (Christian idealism), then, respectively, it follows that the existing social system is either blindly affirmed or else utterly condemned or perhaps completely disregarded.

Thirdly, one further consideration may be adduced in support of the contention that the idea of vocation is central to Christian ethics. It is that if in this way and by means of this idea Christian ethics can contrive to bring into an effective relationship one to another the general principles of the good life and the particular duties which it involves in concrete situations, it will have succeeded in dealing with a problem which has baffled its sister study, secular ethics. On the one hand, this science, as in utilitarianism, has reduced all duties to the one duty of producing as much good as possible, thus manifestly over-simplifying the problem and saying in effect "that the only morally significant relation in which my neighbours stand to me is that of being possible beneficiaries of my action."[1] The new intuitionism, on the other hand, associated with the names of Sir David Ross and Professor H. A. Prichard, while doing much more justice to the complexity of moral experience and to the network of personal relationship, fails to reduce these relationships to a system and leaves the various duties arising from them under the permanent possibility of unrelieved conflict. The truth is that for all its progress secular ethics is no nearer the solution of its central problem of relating principle and circumstance;[2] and, moreover, it has failed largely because it has had no room for the total doctrine of vocation.

Professor E. S. Waterhouse has put it on record that, too much after the example and under the influence of the physical sciences, ethics has disregarded purpose "because it finds no counterpart in the behaviour of solids, liquids, or gases."[3] And, certainly, although it has sometimes treated purposiveness as the peculiar characteristic of human action, and therefore of action amenable to moral distinctions, it has not found room for the concept of a divine purpose. Lacking this, the new intuitionism has failed to present the network

[1] Ross, *The Right and the Good*, p. 19.
[2] *Cf.* Field, "Kant's First Moral Principle," *Mind*, January, 1932, p. 31.
[3] "Ethics and Christian Ethics," *Philosophy*, April, 1943, p. 51.

of personal relationships as even potentially a system, because it has failed to see human purposes in subordination to the comprehensive purposes of God, condemning the former, overruling them, forgiving them, transforming and perfecting them. For this type of ethic there is no *system* of persons since, as there is no divine purpose, there can be no kingdom of God. On the other hand, the utilitarian type of ethics has failed to display an effective relationship between general principle and concrete duty. It has tried to perform the impossible by seeking to work its way down from principle to circumstance (or even, occasionally, as in evolutionary ethics, to work its way up from given circumstance to moral principle). But such an enterprise is not only unsuccessful, but also offers no hope of ultimate success. "Differentiation," says Professor Dickie,[1] "presents one of the most baffling problems of existence. It appears to introduce contingency, the accidental, as dominant features of man's life. . . . A large part of our obedience is not reasoned, but given. . . . The connexion between obedience and vocation is quite fundamental." Or, as Dr E. L. Allen puts it,[2] "there is an element of self-conscious effort in the attempt to find the right adjustment between principle and circumstance which is lacking when we think simply of doing God's will, co-operating with Him in a purpose which includes and yet transcends both these factors."

In a sentence, the unity and self-consistency of the moral life consists neither in a hypothetical system of personal relationships nor in the universality of a moral principle. It does not even consist in the self-identity of God's purpose conceived as utterly above and beyond the capacity of man to understand. It is to be found in the unity of God's purpose which is imperfectly shared by His children, which is partially perverted by their misunderstanding and self-will, and which is yet God's purpose for the world, one purpose which works itself out in all the diverse circumstance of daily living and through the various stations and callings of different men.

If the contention of this argument is sound, it is clear that Christian ethics and Christian preaching ought to emphasize the doctrine of vocation. In a more settled age, perhaps little harm was done if Christian thought proceeded without displaying the essential wholeness of Christian life; but that is no longer so over against the menace of Communism and amid the moral relativism of a neutral society.

N. H. G. Robinson.

The Theology of "Remembrance Sunday"

When the Church of England ministers to her people in the words of her prescribed Liturgies and orders of service in the Book of

---

[1] *The Obedience of a Christian Man*, pp. 93 f.
[2] *The Structure of Life*, p. 87.

Common Prayer her orthodoxy is unquestionable. That has been made a very genuine subject of thanksgiving during the quatercentenary year. But occasions often arise when it is not thought fit to use the prescribed form, and it is then the habit of the Church to put out under authority forms of service for special use. Such forms of service were frequently put out during the late war for use on the national Days of Prayer. Reference to the past files of THEOLOGY makes it clear that these forms very often came under criticism and that the clergy were divided in their opinions about the merits of these attempts. The Church now seems to be committed for an indefinite period to the observance of a Sunday in November (all too often the Sunday in the Octave of All Saints') in commemoration of those who were the victims of the two wars. A form of service now seems to have crystallized and to be in use in those places where the observance in the parish church does not coincide with the office of Morning or Evening Prayer. That form of service merits the most careful study. It should be stated in fairness that the form in general use is not that put out under official sanction from the Archbishops or Convocations, but it is in use in so many cathedrals and "official" churches that it can be said to have achieved the tacit approval of the Church of England officially. There is also in existence a form of service put out under the auspices of the British Legion which only differs from the general practice by the inclusion of a verse and respond from the poet Laurence Binyon. As that has been used frequently in the presence of both Archbishops, it can also be taken to have tacit official approval.

A standard form of observance on this Sunday can be quoted for example. It was held in the cathedral of a diocese on the appropriate Sunday afternoon. It thus formed an irresistible counter-attraction to Sunday school for the scholars of the neighbouring parish churches. There were present, in the principal seats of the nave, the Lord Mayor and most of the councillors and aldermen, a large contingent of the British Legion, a representative company of the garrison battalion and representatives of many civic bodies and bodies indirectly concerned with the welfare of the armed forces. The cathedral staff were there in full force, with the bishop of the diocese and his suffragan. The Sunday being in the Octave of All Saints', the altar was decked in white, though it had not been so arrayed for Morning Prayer or the Eucharist. The bishop, who is a Master of Arts of Cambridge, was wearing the scarf of a Chaplain to the Forces, which rank he relinquished in 1918, and the regalia of an Oxford Doctor of Divinity.

The service opened with the singing of the hymn "For all the Saints." Then a preface was read stating the aims of the service, which were twofold, first to commemorate in God's presence "those who have given their lives in the service of their country and their King, whose names are written in the Lamb's book of life," and second, that "we who survive them should once again dedicate ourselves entirely to God's service." During the singing of the first hymn

the regimental colours, and those of the British Legion, were laid upon the high altar of the cathedral. Then the Lord's Prayer was said, followed by the singing of Psalm 23. The Lesson, which was read by a military dignitary, was from the Wisdom of Solomon, chapter iii, verses 1 to 9, including the words: "The souls of the righteous are in the hands of God, and there shall no torment touch them . . ." and "they shall judge the nations and have dominion over the people." This was followed by the hymn "Let Saints on earth in concert sing, with those whose work is done," and then the congregation were called to prayer. There were three prayers, the first a commemoration of the faithful departed, as given in the deposited book of 1928, the second for those who mourn, that they might be comforted, and the third for the peace of the world. The congregation were then asked to stand while the Dean read a verse of Laurence Binyon:

> "They shall not grow old as we that are left grow old:
> Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.
> At the going down of the sun and in the morning
> We will remember them,"

the last line of which was repeated as a respond. The hymn "O God, our help in ages past," led up to the bishop's sermon.

The text of the sermon was from Ezekiel xvi, 62: "I will establish my covenant with thee: and thou shalt know that I am the Lord thy God." The bishop enlarged on the nature of our national deliverance in the late war, how near we had been to national destruction, and exhorted the congregation to a profound thankfulness. This was not the first time that God had blessed and delivered our nation. It was clear from His treatment of us that we were under a special favour, and we ought to be very conscious of this fact. It was the habit of God to make a covenant or agreement with those nations which He had specially chosen to serve His purposes. The agreement was obviously a two-way relationship. We in turn owed Him our service. What a splendid opportunity this was to renew on our side the terms of the covenant. Those whose splendid sacrifice we were commemorating had led them even to death to fulfil their side of the bargain; was it asking too much that we who remained should live for God as they had died for His service? There could be no doubt that the real worshipping of God was languishing in these days. We had no right to expect an indefinite continuance of God's blessings while these things were so. As we had not failed the cause of our nation in 1939, so now in 1949 let us hasten to implement the terms of God's agreement with us in 1949.

The service concluded with the singing of the hymn "Onward, Christian soldiers," the Last Post and Reveille, and the bishop's blessing. The form of service invited the congregation to visit the War Memorial chapel, in which was kept the Roll of Honour. The inscription on the fly-leaf of the Roll of Honour reads: "Their names are written in the Lamb's book of life."

This can be held to be a typical form of remembrance in the Church of England, and could on the whole be paralleled in the

nonconformist chapels. In the Roman Church the celebration would normally take the form of a Requiem Mass with the propers for All Souls and the commemoration of the departed, unless the service were held on a Sunday. In that case the Roman service, if it were not a Mass, would be on a more subdued note than its Anglican counterpart and would undoubtedly contain matter proper to the observance of All Souls rather than of All Saints.

The standard form of service referred to above has now crystallized into a recognizable pattern and has endured three decades, so that it can be said to enshrine doctrines which are widely held. Those doctrines if stated formally would assume somewhat this form:

1. There is a God in heaven who is the Guardian of our nation, to whose providence we owe our merciful deliverance in the two wars.

2. All citizens as such owe Him a debt of gratitude which is expressed formally in the Remembrance Sunday commemorations and should be further implemented by a national dedication to His service.

3. Those who died in battle in defence of the country were God's agents in the execution of His purposes for England and the world.

4. They have passed through paradise and already enjoy the full vision of God's presence. They are exempt from the judgment and enjoy the status of the canonized saints as martyrs of the faith.

5. The promises of the new covenant are made to nations as such. The nation, assembled as such, may appropriate to itself not only the obligations but also the rights of the Church. Thus the solemn renewal of a nation's covenant with God entitles all nationals to think of themselves as soldiers of Christ, independently of Baptism or of any other religious contract entered into.

That, by inference, is the message of the Church of England to the people on a day of national commemoration. But about inference there can be no final argument. It will be denied that such doctrines are necessarily implied by the forms of service in use, and only 1, 2, and 3 of the above will be held to be legitimate inferences. But it is hard indeed to escape the consequences of the All Saints motif. It becomes the harder for the absence of those ideas, prayers and readings from Scripture which are appropriate to the commemoration of All Souls. But it cannot be denied that the consciences of many clergy are uneasy on this point among others. They may look back wistfully to better days when Archbishop Chichele dedicated All Souls' College to the glory of God after the victory of Agincourt and think that that was a more appropriate dedication. The writer can think back to a study group in the danger zone with the Eighth Army which was asked to consider the question: "If we're bumped off, will they sing 'For all the Saints' for us? Because if they do, they're wasting their time." The modesty of the soldier who asked that question (and he was in fact a Christian) might have helped to qualify him for an inheritance with the saints in light if he had been called upon to make the sacrifice. But there were of

course many of his contemporaries who went into death sinning against the light and utterly unrepentant. It is a caricature of the Christian belief which represents men as necessarily justified by a martial death. Those whose respect for the memory of the dead is deepest will probably be the first to disown such ascriptions.

Perhaps even more misleading is the growing tendency, so manifest in these services, to use hymns which are only appropriate for an assembly of the faithful on occasions when there is a general assembly of citizens gathered together for a national commemoration. The inference is perhaps uncertain. It would be difficult to establish that the singing of "Onward. Christian soldiers" by the mayor, councillors, and members of the British Legion constituted the propagation of wrong teaching concerning the nature of the Church. But the practice certainly has its dangers, especially in a country which is all too ready to regard citizenship as conferring membership of the Kingdom of Heaven as it were *ad eundem*. But in this, as in many other ways, we are the heirs of a very nebulous tradition regarding the Church and its membership. And now the liberal school has been raised up among us to perpetuate, at least for a time, these traditions of vagueness. The witness of both evangelical and catholic streams of thought teaches us to beware of awarding the status of Church membership on easy terms, even by implication. An evangelical writer of the early nineteenth century, in an examination of the consequences of vagueness in the definition of the nature of the Church, protested against

> "the indiscriminate and gregarious manner in which the members of the national Church—gathering, as a matter of course within its fold, the very dregs and refuse of mankind, both spiritually and socially—are addressed in our services. All sponsors are believers; all the baptized are regenerate; all the confirmed forgiven; all the catechumens elect; all kings religious, all the dead subjects of thankfulness; to the total and eternal oblivion of every distinction between the saved and the lost."[1]

It seems a pity that, where there is no need, the citizens of our country should be exposed to the dangers of these implications.

Perhaps the most offensive features of these services is the emasculated use of the idea of dedication. We are informed in the preface that we are assembled to rededicate ourselves to God's service. That carries with it the implication that we are all already so dedicated, which is a doubtful assumption in such assemblies. But even passing that consideration by, it is hard to see how such a service can be regarded as in any real sense offering an opportunity for rededication. It would be an entirely different matter if the service stressed that most of the people present were in need of complete dedication to God. The teaching should then be given that dedication, for most people, would necessitate a long period of preparation and instruction, an act of penitence and renunciation and then the conscious and open confession of Christ in the communion of the Church. That would fulfil both the requirements of the orthodox

[1] The Rev. John Riland in *The British Liturgy*, 1833, quoted in Charles Smyth, *Simeon and Church Order*.

theologian and the hopes of the earnest preacher of the gospel. But the implied suggestion that the Remembrance Sunday service constitutes an act of dedication worth the name is surely an offence to true religion.

It would take a separate volume to examine the theology of the hymn "O valiant hearts," which is now firmly established in the selection of hymns in use on Remembrance Sunday. It makes a comparison between the sacrifice of Calvary and that of those who died on the field of battle, and concludes that the difference is only one of degree and not of kind. It also carries with it the definite implication, more clearly than any other such hymn, that all those who died in battle were conscious followers of "the martyred Son of God." When this hymn assumes its rightful place among the hymns appropriate for All Saints' tide it will be a welcome addition to Christian hymnody. As it stands to-day, the characteristic anthem of "Remembrance Sunday," it is a sad document of the doctrinal aberrations of the Church of England in the twentieth century.

It is worthy of note that the tendencies in these services referred to here are characteristic of the English-speaking world of the present time and would be hard to parallel either in the other countries of what is still called Christendom or in the past history of the Church of England or in the past history of any other part of the Christian Church. The conclusion must therefore be that either the Church of England has been vouchsafed a new doctrinal revelation or that she is in danger of having erred.

The construction of a possible alternative form of service is not as difficult as might be supposed. The aims are clear, and agreed. They are, first, to commemorate the dead; second, to thank God for our national deliverance; third, to awaken in the citizenry a sense of national apostasy; and fourth, to assure them of the unlimited blessings of God available to those who approach Him through His Son in a spirit of penitence. The first of these is straightforward. The universal pattern of the commemoration of the dead is set for us in the Prayer Book office for the Burial of the Dead (1662, avoiding dangerous liberal tendencies creeping in in 1928). The thanksgiving part of the service is already quite satisfactory. There are numerous appropriate passages in the Old Testament, and their teaching is well summed up in the hymn "O God, our help in ages past." The third part should require that there should be a forcible expression of penitence in every such service. The preacher's theme, on the pattern of the prophets of Israel, should include detailed reference to the ways in which as a nation we have failed to please God. The fourth should leave no doubt about the necessity of dedication, but it should point forward to it as a goal to be aimed at, and not refer to it as something achieved simply by attendance at one service. It should stress the renunciation involved in the Christian life and at least refer to the dangers besetting those who, having heard the Christian challenge, decline to take it up. There need be no references to the Church and no unwarrantable boasting. These services, which for a large part of the population con-

stitute their only remaining contact with religion, deserve the most careful attention of the Church's best theologians and pastors. The Council for Evangelism might well devote its attention to the redemption of them.

B. C. Pawley.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Mr Beckett is a Lecturer in Modern History in the Queen's University of Belfast.

Dr Robinson is the Parish Minister of Rothesay, Isle of Bute.

The Rev. B. C. Pawley is Rector of Elland, Yorks.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE FAST BEFORE COMMUNION

To the Editor of Theology.

Dear Sir,

Fr Crehan first produced the response of Timothy of Alexandria, as though it were an original contribution to this discussion, in his letter of May, 1949. I therefore treated rather fully Dearmer's discussion of it in his book. I exposed Dearmer's error upon the authenticity of the passage; I showed reason to doubt the accuracy of his interpretation. I said, in fact, that he had explained it away, and I gave the reader the texts to judge for himself. It is singular, therefore, of Fr Crehan to castigate me for holding an opinion of which I pronounced myself sceptical. The inaccuracy of his representation of what I wrote will be palpable to any of your readers who may care to compare the passages (*supra*, pp. 16, 149); the "one man" at Alexandria is, for instance, Fr Crehan's own invention. He may, by assuming what is to be proved, put what interpretation he pleases upon the passage; I, in the absence of corroborative evidence (of which the later interpretations of the canonists provide none), remain agnostic. I stand by what I wrote.

Fr Crehan next introduces the letter of St John Chrysostom to Cyriacus (*ep.* 125) as one I had not noticed—another apparently original contribution to the discussion. And on the basis of this letter he controverts my interpretation of the passage on temperance in the Homily. I hardly thought it necessary to encumber my article with a discussion of a letter widely held to be spurious for the last two centuries; if I erred, I erred in a company which includes the Bollandist Stilting (*Acta Sanctorum*, Sept., t. iv., 1753, pp. 611-613) and Pope Benedict XIV (J. Wickham Legg, *Papal Faculties allowing Food before Communion*, 1905, p. 41). If the letter can be proved to be authentic, then, of course, the question of its interpretation is reopened. As far as I remember, Thurston, who had read Dearmer on the letter, did not try. Until that is done, we are left with the

Homily and the plain sense of the words. The dialogue with which Fr Crehan concludes his paragraph above, and the clear distinction alleged between temperance and the eucharistic fast, are products of his imagination; again he assumes what is to be proved, and makes the assumption his proof.

In his treatment of St Augustine's letter to Januarius Fr Crehan adopts the same method; he assumes a "common ground between the two men" which is to be proved, and then asks a series of hypothetical questions to suit his assumption. The only "common ground" evident from Januarius's questions, which are precise enough, is that in some churches on Maundy Thursday there is a morning Eucharist as well as the evening one customary in Lent and on fasting days; that in other churches there is one only, after supper; and in other churches, one only with the supper after it. Where fasting comes into the matter, it is in relation to the Lenten fast, which Communion, early or late, would terminate as finally as the supper. The question, as the full text of the letter clearly shows, is primarily one of the due honouring of Maundy Thursday as the day of the Last Supper—a question solved differently in different churches. The one question Januarius did not raise is the one Fr Crehan says he did.

On the meaning of *celebrare* in St Augustine's conciliar document I am prepared to grant Fr Crehan his point, though I have not yet verified it in detail. *Celebrare* may well include the lay people as well as the priest. It was well for them also not to have dined before the Commemoration; in view of the apposition of *jejunus* with *non pransus* in the text I adhere to that interpretation, and I apply it to lay assistants or communicants also. I am grateful for the point.

Upon the Declaration of Theophilus of Alexandria I admit, too, an inaccurate statement; carelessly, I wrote as though the Epiphany itself and not its vigil fell on a Sunday. That admission made, I beg leave to retort that the misconstruction of the text is Fr Crehan's, not mine. The day itself, Sunday, is the vigil, the fasting-day, and so it is called in the text—ἡ νήστιμος ἡμερα (A. Gallandius, *Bibliotheca Vet. Pat.*, vii, Venetiis 1770, p. 603. The passage is also cited with this meaning in E. A. Sophocles, *Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods*, 1914). And so it is to be observed. The handful of dates are to be taken, however, in order to dissociate the faithful from the heretics who refuse to honour the day of the Lord's Resurrection, and fast on Sundays. Otherwise the fast-day is to be observed as usual, and they are to "await the evening assembly" —την ἑσπερινην συναξιν—and to gather together (συναχθωμεν) at the ninth hour—*i.e.*, at three o'clock, the time for the Eucharist on a fasting day. There is no mention in the text of Fr Crehan's morning Eucharist, and there is no conceivable relevance in his reference to Etheria, who simply tells us that "vigils were to be kept in the Church on the same day."

May I say finally that it was with much diffidence that I undertook to examine the work of a scholar of Thurston's reputation; it is now a matter of some relief to me that his literary executor has

not felt obliged to challenge my criticisms of Thurston in detail at all. I could have wished, as I answered Fr Crehan's letter, that I felt entirely sure that he has ever read Dearmer's book; a doubt raised by his first letter is only confirmed by his second. Certainly he has not read my articles carefully enough to appreciate the purpose of my review, or the extent of my agreements with and differences from Dearmer and Thurston both, or even—if I understand the opening of his final paragraph correctly—the proximity of my conclusions (*e.g., supra,* p. 59) to his own.

I am, Sir,
Yours faithfully,
G. R. DUNSTAN.

SUTTON COURTNEY VICARAGE,
ABINGDON.

CALVIN

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

I am in full sympathy with the Rev. T. H. L. Parker's claim (in your March issue) that Calvin should be understood from within. And there are available to-day studies of Calvin (of which not the least distinguished is Dr T. F. Torrance's *Calvin's Doctrine of Man*) which should rule out serious misjudgments.

But it ought to be admitted from the Reformed side that for all his terrific power and greatness there is something appallingly provincial about Calvin. Mr Parker would appeal from Calvin inconsistent to Calvin consistent, and would apparently find in the latter "the authentic witness to Jesus Christ."

These are very far-reaching words. I venture to think that Calvin never saw fully the problem of honest divergences in matters of doctrine and of erring conscience; and also that he never adequately reflected upon the relation between the Word of God and the total experience of mankind. In the last resort *sola scriptura* does not mean single-minded devotion to Christ; it means a limited and truncated obedience to Him.

Yours faithfully,
HUBERT CUNLIFFE-JONES.

YORKSHIRE UNITED INDEPENDENT COLLEGE,
BRADFORD.

BOOK REVIEWS

ABELARD'S CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. By J. R. McCallum. Blackwell. 7s. 6d.

Abelard's treatise, *Theologia Christiana,* is one of three doctrinal studies which internal evidence shows to be closely connected. Of the series the *De Unitate et Trinitate Divina* is said to be the first, the *Theologia* a revision, and the *Introductio ad Theologiam* a yet further revision. If the first is the treatise which was condemned at the Council of Soissons (1121), we may be fairly definite about both

the date and the biographical significance of the second. Mr McCallum, working on the findings of J. G. Sikes, accepts the date as 1123-4. The significance of the treatise will depend on the significance of Soissons. The work is to be read less as a specimen of Abelard's point of view in general than as a polemical pamphlet, restating the author's challenged faith, subject to the overstatements and excitements which such episodes breed, pulsating with the earnestness and urgency of an apologia.

Abelard's main burden here is his contention that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is in accord with the powers and principles of natural, human reasoning. In his fervour to counter any suggestion that in Christ a wholly new and unpredictable revelation has arrived he feels himself constrained to state, if necessary, in an extreme form the exact opposite. For him the doctrine is "not begun by Christ, but delivered more clearly and thoroughly by him" (*non a Christo incœptam, sed ab ipso apertius ac diligentius traditam*). He supports his contention with quotations from the Old Testament and Apocrypha (for the Jewish religion) and from Greek, especially Plato, and Roman writers and one Brahmin reference (for the Gentiles), completing his evidence with a neat summary of the medieval stock in trade, collected from Augustine and Anselm, to illustrate the image of the Trinity in nature.

His discussion of Plato's theory is the central philosophic portion of the pamphlet. But the nerve of Abelard's view is briefly stated earlier. It contains what may be recognized as a brilliant anticipation of those insights of the schoolmen which came to fruition after the rediscovery and consequent christianization of the Aristotelian *corpus*. His rational exposition of the Trinitarian doctrine is not (as is implied in this new English version) a naïve repetition along well-worn Platonist lines of the "Power-Wisdom-Goodness" motif, which Aquinas listed among later commonplaces (*Summa Theologica*, I, q. xxxix, art 8, ad 3 um). The terms which Abelard actually employs are: *potentia, sapientia, benignitas*. These he claims to be appropriate to the particular actions of the Three Persons, and he subsumes all three under *summi boni perfectio, quod Deus est*. Thus: *in his itaque tribus, Potentia, scilicet, Sapientia, Benignitate, tota Boni perfectio consistit* (Lib. I, cap. ii). This forgotten formula is obscured when, as here, *benignitas* is read as *bonitas*; but a reconsideration of it is essential to any restatement of Abelard's teaching.

The full treatise is long, running to 200 columns in Migne (*P.L.*, vol. 178). The present study includes introductory chapters, appendices, and selections from the work, freely translated.

GORING-BY-SEA. W. W. S. MARCH.

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GRACE. By H. D. Gray. Independent Press. 8s. 6d.

If the would-be reader can manage to survive the incredible sentimentality of the brief foreword and the profusion of purple verbiage

out of which the first chapter has been hacked, he will find himself presented with an account of the historical development of the doctrine of grace, extending over six chapters. This account is somewhat vitiated by the profusion of categorical statements, with no hint of a qualification, and by a bitter antipathy to the teaching of the "Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and High Anglican Churches" (whatever the last may be). Such an historical survey has been done and better done before.

In the remaining seven chapters, which seem to have no specific connexion with the preceding, Dr Gray elaborates his own theory of grace which is remarkable both for its extent (hardly any aspect of Christian life and beliefs is omitted) and for its shallowness. The argument is based upon the implicit *non sequitur* that as the New Testament *Χάρις* is not the same as the Augustinian *gratia*, the latter has no valid meaning. Grace, according to Dr Gray, is "God's activity in holy love, the expression of His fatherly care for man." This "Fatherliness" extends to all men, therefore—again I cannot follow the logic—there can be no exclusiveness, creeds are unnecessary, universalism is the only acceptable position and the sacraments are not "means of grace". If it be asked, what then are the sacraments, the confused reply is that they are "symbols", "emblems of fellowship", with "rich historical associations". The Church is "the fellowship of those who follow Christ", and its oneness is "the fellowship of those in all branches of the Church who share a common loyalty" to God. Admittedly the phrase "the Body of Christ" is used occasionally, but there is not the slightest suggestion of the New Testament conception of a living organism, indwelt by a personal Spirit, into which men are grafted by Baptism and within which they become sharers in the sacrificial life of Christ and partakers of His fullness. On the contrary, such statements as the following abound: "The office, store, bank, and factory may be instruments of God's love and care just as truly as the school, the hospital, or the Church." Indeed, the Bride of Christ seems to have many legitimate rivals in Dr Gray's mind.

How far, in default of explicit statements, an inadequate appreciation of the doctrine of the Trinity is in part responsible for the shortcomings of this work it would be hazardous to say, but constant references to "God as Spirit," to "Christ as God among men," and the affirmation that Christ was "not One who is part man and part God in mysterious union, but One who is God in man come among us," indicate a lack of clarity which cannot but affect the work as a whole.

The one element of value is the repeated emphasis that *gratia* implies too impersonal an approach of God to man, but this surely is not ground for dismissing the concept, but of reinterpreting it in personal terms; in so doing I would suggest that the late Dr N. P. Williams' identification of grace and the Holy Spirit is likely to be of considerable assistance.

The University,
Birmingham.

J. G. Davies.

SEEDS OF CONTEMPLATION. By Thomas Merton. Hollis and Carter. 8s. 6d.

This book, which follows swiftly, perhaps too swiftly, upon *Elected Silence*, has been compiled from "the disconnected thoughts and ideas and aphorisms about the interior life" upon which Father Louis, as the author is now styled, has been ruminating: "the kind of book," he says, "that writes itself almost automatically in a monastery"—an admission which few readers will feel disposed to dispute. It is certainly a less unsatisfactory work than its predecessor, being calmer in manner, more restrained, and less self-dramatizing. There are twenty-seven chapters in its two hundred pages, mostly brief, upon a variety of subjects, such as Solitude, Integrity, Liberty, Renunciation, Pure Love, all loosely connected but professedly designed to illustrate the nature and interpret the experience of the contemplative life, which, we are told, is what Christ came on earth to reveal—"to form contemplatives and teach the ways of sanctity and prayer." Not all readers will feel that this is an adequate or comprehensive representation of Christ's mission on earth. But Father Louis has no doubts about it, any more than he has, or appears to have, about many profound mysteries of faith and practice.

To say this is not in the least to disparage the distinctive quality of much that Father Louis writes; he stimulates curiosity, invites reflection, often challenges the conscience, and with a few interpolated homilies, spontaneous and unconventional, gives some shrewd counsel. But when he embarks upon the more intricate and controversial matters of theology and metaphysics he becomes too often the victim of words. Sweeping generalizations too, albeit relieved at times by a few clever aphorisms, abound throughout the book, the effect of which is to emphasize the immaturity rather than suggest the insight of the author.

In all probability the pivotal point of the book for most readers will be the eager, ambitious, but not quite successful attempt to describe the soul's total surrender to God, which involves the experience of utter darkness (not, it seems, the familiar dark night of the soul in mystic pilgrimage) after and through which comes the revelation of God Himself. "He who is infinite light is so tremendous in His evidence that our minds only see Him as darkness." Had Father Louis been content to leave it at that his words might have challenged and held attention. But he seeks to explain. "Naked I wait thy love's uplifted stroke"—the poet's few but all-illuminating words tell us more than many chapters of disquisition. But what is the explanation offered? "To find God we must pass beyond everything that can be seen and enter into darkness. Since nothing that can be heard is God, to find Him we must enter into silence. Since God cannot be imagined, anything our imagination tells us about Him is ultimately a lie. Faith reaches the intellect not through the senses but in a light directly infused by God. . . . This light does not pass through the eye or the imagination or reason." The author is at liberty, of course, to think like this and hold this view; but

before he decides to accept it as final he might, perhaps, with advantage consult Coleridge, who has something to say on the matter of imagination; possibly, too, the Cambridge Platonists might suggest a thing or two.

The general impression left by this book is on the whole disappointing. Despite its various and not inconsiderable merits it fails to carry conviction. The theme and purpose are weighty; the treatment too often is doctrinaire and slick. The self-centredness so apparent in *Elected Silence*, where perhaps it was pardonable, has no proper place in a work such as this; it is a blemish. It would be indeed ungenerous and unfair to impute to Father Louis an insensitiveness to the sorrows of the world he has renounced; but what are the implications of the following passage? "If I have this life in me, what do the accidents of pain and pleasure, hope and fear, joy and sorrow, matter to me? They are not my life, and they have little to do with it. . . . Exterior things come and go, but why should they touch me? . . . It is the easiest thing in the world to possess this life and this joy; all you have to do is to believe and love." Individual suffering is one thing: the cross of suffering humanity is another. Interior peace may transfigure the first: the second must tear the heart. From this crucial conflict the Man of Sorrows permitted Himself no self-detachment. No contemplation made that burden unreal. Are we to suppose that these numbing experiences are but fleeting shadows upon the life of secluded serenity? Is incarnation just a Sisyphean incubus upon the tranquil journey of the cloistered soul? The masters of the contemplative life were in no doubt.

E. M. Venables.

The Cloisters,
Windsor Castle.

Booker T. Washington. By Basil Matthews. S.C.M. Press. 18s.

The life story of an illiterate slave boy of mixed blood who by his own efforts acquired the rudiments of a sound education, and who by the sheer force of his personality became, whilst still in his twenties, an educator of black men and women and of white, and later the founder of a technical and academic co-educational college of international fame, the political leader of his people, and a trusted adviser to two successive Presidents of the United States—all this goes far to establish the truth of the dictum that (sometimes at any rate) fact is stranger than fiction. It is fortunate that his story has been told by so discerning and conscientious a biographer as Basil Matthews, who never fails to bring a thrill of inspiration to every theme he touches. And it is to the biographies of the individuals who have fashioned history, rather than to the historical movements themselves, that the historian must look for a true understanding of history. Biography, as Rudolf Otto pointed out long ago, is only a real narration of a real life where, by the interplay of stimulus and experience on the one side, and predisposition and natural endow-

ment on the other, something individual and unique comes into being. Of such tensions between character and circumstance the life of Booker Washington is full; and as a result of them the fortunes of a continent were changed.

His life history affords material alike for the ethnologist, the psychologist, the sociologist, and the student of religion. Even the story of his boyhood and youth is in itself a minor epic: it shows that rare blend of toughness and tenderness, of fortitude and sympathy, already there latent in the bud before it grew and burgeoned into a mighty, wide-branching tree; it shows the spirit dominant to every situation; the calm, collected courage of a child destined by his own character for some achievement far beyond the ordinary. Nursed as he was from infancy, like all his tribe, "in the quaint and primitive theology of the plantation hymns" and tales of the exodus of the children of Israel out of bondage under the leadership of Moses, he found himself—with his mother, his elder brother, and his little sister—suddenly released at the age of nine from the ordered and sober securities of slavery into the insecurities of a chaotic and bewildering freedom. Freedom—for what? All asked; none knew.

"Freedom had been thrust upon the negroes overnight," and that without a thought of equipping them for the responsibilities of free citizenship. The more one studies that post-war period of so-called reconstruction, the more one realizes how infinitely much better the lot of the negroes had been as slaves than they became as "freemen," and it presents America with a problem which has not yet been solved. "They [the Reconstructionists] missed the essential truth, the ignoring of which inevitably wrecks projects of reform, that suddenly to remove external control and direction without developing inner discipline and obedience to principles of justice and toleration produces chaos and a corrupt new despotism." It may be said that Booker Washington's life is an object-lesson on the truth of these words. As one reads it—and it is an absorbing study—one perceives that the source and secret of this man's dynamic power lay in his single-minded but restrained passion for *purposeful* freedom. His personality reveals itself as the exhibition of an almost impersonal selflessness. Tuskegee was the symbol of his life; there he taught his staff and pupils to harness—as he had taught himself to harness—head and hand together in a united and unifying activity for a single aim—namely, to fulfil the purpose for which they were, each one of them, created. It was this combination of idealism with realism, of theory with practice, head with hand, that lay at the root of his greatness as an educator. He longed to make his people self-reliant, independent of help from any government agencies. His principle of leadership was simple: "finding folk where they are and guiding them to where they ought to be."

It is improbable that the psycho-analyst could find in this character anything to analyse; it was too simple and too transparent; also, it was too selfless. The theologian will be equally disappointed. This man's main reading was the Bible (that, and Shakespeare), but innocent of any doctrinal interpretation. And what he read most

frequently in it were the Psalms and the Sermon on the Mount. Late in life he said, "I have never been greatly interested in the past, for the past is something that you cannot change. I like the new, the unfinished, and the problematic." Cosmopolitan in all things, he was a member of no ecclesiastical denomination. One would have liked to know more about his inner thoughts; but of these we are told very little; he had a reticence, and probably he supposed that his inner thoughts would not be particularly interesting to anybody. One learns something from a study of his face (two good illustrations are given in this book—one from a bust, the other a photograph). It is plain, the nose straight and flat, the mouth wide and curved and upturned optimistically at the corners, the upper lip long and firm, the chin strong but not prominent, the eyes thoughtful, steady, and observant. Humanity is there and kindliness—forcefulness and forthrightness above all. Irresistibly these words come to mind:

> Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,
> These three alone lead life to sovereign power.

KILKENNY. GEORGE SEAVER.

THE WITNESS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT TO CHRIST. Vol. I—The Pentateuch. By Wilhelm Vischer. Translated by A. B. Crabtree. Lutterworth Press. 25s.

The publication of an English translation of the first of the two volumes that have so far appeared of Vischer's *Das Christuszeugnis des Alten Testaments* is something of an event. It will give readers in this country a chance to come to grips with a remarkable book which has seemed like a cat among the theological pigeons of the Continent for well over ten years now. The debate is by no means over there and here it has yet hardly touched the really crucial questions. Vischer starts with the traditional Christian belief about the Bible which he finds exemplified in Luther's sermons and which Anglicans can read in Article VII—that "both in the Old and New Testament everlasting life is offered to Mankind *by Christ*." That is easy enough to say; but what are its precise implications for exegesis and how does it square with the increasingly subtle critical investigation of the Old Testament text? It is the first outstanding feature of Vischer's book that he goes systematically through the Pentateuch, passage by passage, and endeavours to show just how it is a revelation of salvation through Christ. The result is that a reader can test for himself in detail what a "Christological interpretation" of the Old Testament really amounts to, and this is precisely the point at which discussion should begin, at the present time. We are all now convinced of the necessity of a theological interpretation of the Old Testament; we are even apt to claim to have recovered it. But the content of our theology, when the Bible is in question, remains distressingly vague, and we have not yet seriously faced the problem

presented by Vischer in his important footnote on p. 28 of the present edition, when he asks whether it is possible for the Christian to have a theology which is not also a Christology. It is a failure to consider this seriously which vitiates, for example, Dr C. R. North's recent article in *The Scottish Journal of Theology* and, indeed, most English writing on the topic.

Whatever one may think about the details of his exegesis, Vischer's effort is not to be ignored. He is very sensible and he understands the principles of modern biblical criticism, though scholarship has moved a long way even since he wrote, and his main concern is to present Scripture as a whole and in its final form rather than to seek either for written sources or oral tradition lying behind it. The Old Testament is prophecy not allegory, and, as a result, Vischer can make it quite plain in his exegesis that some parts of it (*e.g.*, the sacrifice of Isaac) witness more directly to Christ than do others (*e.g.*, the building of the Tower of Babel). Of course, he has his own particular hobby-horses, such as Dacqué's theories about the Flood, which it is perhaps kindest to ignore, and sometimes he appears not to face difficulties raised by biblical criticism, as when he treats Abraham's alleged relations with the Philistines as an actual historical event, though all the evidence is dead against the presence of the Philistines in Canaan as early as the time of the first patriarch. But these are comparatively small blemishes and do not affect the essential importance of Vischer's work.

It is a pity this English version is not more carefully produced and translated. Misprints are very numerous, and, surely, in a translation the German abbreviation "S" (for *Seite*) should be replaced by the English "p" (for *page*), even when referring to foreign works. More serious, the translator frequently fails to catch the exact shade of meaning in the German, and there are some downright mistakes—*e.g.*, "there is no suitor" (p. 87) is the rendering of "da ist kein Freier," which really means "no man is free from it"; "serpent of the underworld" (p. 180) is incorrect for "Urweltschlange"; instead of "in the effort to invest his life and the world with meaning" (p. 193) for "um durch sein eignes Wirken seinem Leben und der Welt den Sinn zu geben," we should have "to give meaning to his life and the world by his own effort." It is to be hoped that the translation of Vischer's next volume will be overseen more carefully before it appears in order to avoid similar blemishes.

Oriel College, Oxford. J. R. Porter.

For To-day. By D. T. Niles. Lutterworth Press. 8s. 6d.
The Old Testament in the Church. By J. Woods. S.P.C.K. 9s. 6d.

These two books have much in common. They are both written from the mission field and they are both written to bring biblical theology to the ordinary practising Christian.

Mr Woods in his foreword quotes Barth's dictum that "the normal

central fact with which dogmatics has to do is, very simply, the Church's Sunday sermon of yesterday and to-morrow." Mr Niles's book is a book of Scriptural meditations for every day in the year.

Both writers are careful to avoid confusion in methods of interpretation of the Old Testament. Mr Niles sticks firmly to the literal meaning, but deals far too severely with allegorical interpretation (*cf.* Meditation for March 1). Mr Woods quotes with approval Luther's words about allegorical interpretation being permissible, but as "mere spangles and pretty ornaments."

Mr Niles, who is a Ceylonese Methodist minister, was the preacher at the opening service at Amsterdam, and is associated with the movement towards Christian union in Ceylon. He has written a book which has, for its own tradition and day, the same aim as books of meditations like Avancini's and Challoner's had for theirs. Its purpose is to ground Christians in the great facts of the Faith and also to bring them face to face with God.

The theme for the first half of the year is "The Christian life—its necessity, its beginning, its basis, its difficulties, its implications; and above all its joy, its peace, and its power." The theme for the second half of the year is "The life of Christ—its beauty, its authority, its relevance, its adequacy, its wholeness; and above all its significance for each man and through all generations." It is assumed that our Lord's ministry lasted three years, and that the chronological order of the main events can be seen in the Gospels. The author makes clear that the same Word of God speaks to the soul in the Old Testament and in the New. The meditations are again and again extremely valuable and penetrating, and likely to bring directly to the individual Christian "the sword of the Spirit which is the Word of God." They are, however, likely to be most appreciated within Mr Niles's own tradition. There are from time to time sharp jolts for Christians of older traditions. He writes of the value of open confession, and includes a reverent meditation on the Blessed Virgin Mary. Instead, however, of the belief that Mary was ever virgin, there is the belief expressed that she was, in the natural sense, the Mother of a large family of which Jesus was the Firstborn. He makes a sharp antithesis between "the quest of the mystic" and "the quest of the Christian." Those who work through the book prayerfully for a year are likely to gain a great deal, but it is a pity it does not take account of the scheme of the Christian year. The meditation for December 25, for instance, is on our Lord's going up to Jerusalem.

Mr Woods' book sums up much of the best of what has been thought and written about the Old Testament in relation to the New. He shows that it is possible to value the work of the "skilled linguist, anthropologist, textual and form critic, Assyriologist and archæologist" on the Old Testament and also to hold that the important thing is to believe with the Church that "the faith of the Old Testament was in the Christ which is to come." He calls attention to the need for a companion book to *The Riddle of the New Testament* called "The Riddle of the Old Testament," but modestly

says that "such a book must wait till a scholar feels called to deal with the subject."

The Old Testament in the Church should be a useful book for many theological students and intelligent lay folk, and the numerous and excellent quotations give introductions to much good reading. Also, it may well be a help to clergymen who find their daily readings from both the Old Testament and the New Testament rather heavy going.

The style is that of the fairly popular lecture. Mr Woods writes from Uzuakoli, Nigeria. (Is he a lecturer at an African Theological college?)

On p. 97 the Song of Songs is dismissed with less than justice. The Bible contains the word of God about man as well as the word of God about God.

The Foreword to *For To-day* begins with the words of St John Chrysostom "The cause of all our evils is in our not knowing the Scriptures." The Foreword to *The Old Testament in the Church* begins with words of W. Sanday: "The full rediscovery and reappropriating of the O.T. are the special problems of the day." Both books are useful contributions to the remedying of the evils and the solving of the problems.

D. G. Hill.

Eynsford.

SHORTER NOTICES

Theory of Knowledge: An Introduction. By A. D. Woozley. Hutchinson University Library. 7s. 6d.

As the author of this book rightly says, you cannot introduce non-experts to Theory of Knowledge except at an elementary level. It is greatly to his credit that his exposition is not merely lucid for the beginner, but illuminating for the professional, whom he wrongly avers "has nothing to gain by reading it." Tutors will, I fancy, be extremely grateful for this excellent introduction to some of the problems concerned with knowing and believing. But it does more than introduce. It displays, for example, many of the considerable virtues of the linguistic approach favoured by modern philosophers. Yet Mr Woozley is never anything but scrupulously fair in the exposition of views and methods with which he disagrees. Best of all, perhaps, he has succeeded, where so many introductions fail, in showing that these are real and important questions. Again, the book is not confined, like so many, to problems about Perception. It discusses Memory, Universals, Truth, Knowledge, and Belief quite as fully as Perception; and it skilfully indicates how these problems are connected and how the solution of one affects one's answers to the others. In particular, the discussion of Universals disentangles the difficulties which arise for theories of Perception, Knowledge, and Belief from the traditional dichotomy of facts and propositions. This is, I think, the most valuable chapter, and best indicates the

technique of linguistic analysis for solving problems. Mr Woozley's theory of Memory as "direct acquaintance with the past" is less satisfactory and at times even obscure. I should have thought it was also open to criticism on his own favourite grounds, appeal to linguistic usage. A short bibliography would have further encouraged the beginner "to cultivate his taste for *haute couture* in philosophy," which is the writer's avowed aim; particularly when he has succeeded so well in making other views, past or present, both inviting and worthy of more detailed study. I hope the publishers will be encouraged to bring out a similar introduction for beginners in moral philosophy, informed with the clarity, wit, and penetration which are to be found in this book.

ROGER YOUNG.

ST CATHARINE'S,
WINDSOR GREAT PARK.

THE MIRACLE OF THE MOUNTAINS. By I. M. Kingsbury. Clonmore and Reynolds, Dublin. 3s. 6d.

This book, shorter, cheaper, and more compassable than that just published in England by W. T. Walsh, is written to tell young Irish Roman Catholics the story of Our Lady of Fatima. It is to be recommended to Anglicans who want accurate information on this topic, being exceptionally well written and free from sugary sentiment.

Like the apparitions of Mary at La Salette in 1846 and Lourdes in 1858, those at Fatima (Portugal) in 1917 were to ignorant peasant children out in the open air. In all three cases there was a special message; in all three cases cures followed at the new shrine. At Fatima the message was a call for devotion to the "Immaculate Heart of Mary," and for sacrifices in reparation for the sins committed against it. Consequently, in 1942, the Pope consecrated the whole world to the Immaculate Heart of Mary: "Mother of Mercy, obtain peace for us from God!" Non-Roman Christendom must reckon with the double challenge of both the factual evidences and the Mariological development associated with them.

BASIL S. MOSS.

LINCOLN THEOLOGICAL COLLEGE.

THE ESSENTIALS OF THEISM. By D. J. B. Hawkins. Sheed and Ward. 7s. 6d.

There are certain types of book which succeed in getting themselves written over and over again. No doubt they are concerned with themes which are perennially relevant and repeatedly forgotten. It must be added that they often succeed in getting themselves rewritten exceedingly well. Perhaps constant repetition has made them a little easier to write. Perhaps the composition of them is a project with a special attraction for able and lucid minds. Whatever the reason, a reviewer constantly finds himself confronted with

a book which, judged purely on its own merits, must be warmly praised and commended, and yet the praise and commendation are tempered by the question, which he cannot altogether suppress: "Need the author have done again what has been done so often, so recently, and so well?"

The Essentials of Theism is just such a book. It is written from the point of view of those who find their chief intellectual inspiration and guidance in the great philosophers of the Middle Ages. It is not necessarily the worse for that. One does not have to be a neo-scholastic in order to recognize the greatness and permanent relevance of medieval philosophy. The argument is concise and clear, and there can be no question that this book may worthily take its place beside the many other well-written and authoritative expositions of this particular point of view. The only trouble is that there are so many of them already. The particular shelf reserved for this type of treatise is becoming overloaded, and not a year goes by without the addition of at least one more title to this section of the catalogue.

But it would be perhaps unjust to labour this particular complaint. The book itself is an excellent summary of a point of view in philosophy whose demise has frequently been heralded and even proclaimed but has somehow not yet taken place. And as one fashionable refutation of the *philosophia perennis* gives way to another—the history of modern philosophy is littered with their corpses—one begins to suspect that it never will. It is true that the present author prefers to deal with earlier rather than contemporary forms of the critical rejection of the classical demonstrative metaphysics. For him Kant is the arch-critic, and his defence of his positions usually takes the form of a refutation of Kant's refutations. This task is discharged shrewdly and forcefully enough, except perhaps in the case of the chapter on causality, where the author brushes aside Kant's views so airily that he himself seems to feel a certain amount of misgiving. "Is this too cavalier a treatment of Kant?" he asks in the penultimate paragraph. And indeed his misgivings are anything but groundless. This preoccupation with Kantian and ignoring of contemporary criticism is the chief weakness of the book. Its prevailing atmosphere is too serenely remote from the present troubled situation of Western philosophy. Apart from that not unimportant criticism, the book can be confidently recommended to all those who require yet another study of this kind. But can they be so many?

EXETER. J. V. LANGMEAD CASSERLEY.

A SHORT GUIDE TO CHRISTIAN SEX EDUCATION. Mowbray. 1s. 6d.

This twenty-four-page booklet, drawn up by the Education Committee of the Oxford Diocesan Moral Welfare Council, arose out of a School for Speakers held in 1946. As Canon Hodgson states in an Introduction, it is intended as a Speakers' Handbook, containing

specimen syllabuses for different types of audience, and is to be used as a guide in putting one's own material into the particular form required. The syllabuses are prefaced by an introductory essay setting out the Church's obligation and opportunity in sex education, and making some practical suggestions on educating parents, teachers and youth leaders, schools, and youth groups.

The three syllabuses comprise respectively a general outline on the Christian Tradition of Marriage and the Family (by the Bishop of Oxford), an outline for those approaching marriage, and a syllabus of four lectures to youth clubs. Their value lies not so much in their actual content, about which there will be divergent views regarding points of emphasis and omissions as well as underlying theology: rather, they are to be welcomed because they are examples which have been tried out in practice.

Of many points which invite comment one or two must suffice. It is not only a *lack* of vocabulary (as is said on p. 10) which confounds the parent: a *technical* vocabulary can be equally confounding to the child if he can only make wild guesses at what is being "wrapped up." It might perhaps have been pointed out that in the syllabus for youth clubs all the abstract ideas would generally have to be translated into concrete terms. Again, in connexion with informal methods of education, reference could be made to the "question box" as a means of obtaining anonymous questions which might not be asked personally, and which can be discussed naturally together with other questions having no emotional content.

This booklet is only a contribution; but, where much remains to be said and done, it can be gratefully received. If it stimulates more clergy, teachers, and youth leaders to have the courage to face this difficult responsibility, it will fully justify itself. The fear and unhappiness caused by ignorance and misinformation, not only among adolescents, but also among married people (who are presumed to know "the facts of life"), offer a challenge to the Church which cannot be ignored. Although the schools are taking up the challenge (Educational Pamphlet No. 119, 1943), sex education is also a matter for continued education, since many of the ethical and emotional tangles do not arise under the school leaving age. Until we have county colleges the Church and youth groups must face the responsibility alone.

ASTON, BIRMINGHAM. KEITH CRIPPS.

MARY HUGHES. By Rosa Hobhouse, with a foreword by Howard Spring. Rockliff. 6s.

Mary Hughes, the daughter of Tom Hughes, went much further than the more gentleman-like Christian Socialism of her more staid Victorian father. She insisted on proclaiming and practising the absolute Christian ethic as she saw it. She lived and worked among the most hopeless outcasts in the slums of London. A Poor Law guardian and a J.P., she yet described herself as a "communist" and insisted on being called "comrade." She became a pacifist and

joined the Quakers. On one occasion she refused to have a fire in her room, declaring, "I am always warm, burning with indignation at the wrongs inflicted on the poor and distressed." She nevertheless preserved the gaiety, vitality, and sentimentality of her generation.

Mrs Hobhouse's biography, written with all the loving candour that one expects from a member of the Society of Friends, reveals, in fact, that Mary Hughes never entirely forgot her origin. From the squalor of Whitechapel, where the humility engendered by her way of life "led to a closer exterior likeness to the down-and-outs whose servant she became," she could still speak of how "we the possessing and governing classes" have failed in "our stewardship." She always insisted on going her own way and was "easy to love but hard to live with."

Mrs Hobhouse, though preserving some of the healthy traditional Nonconformist inhibitions against such things as bugs, shares Mary Hughes's somewhat—to a more sober-minded, if less inspired, generation—extravagantly romantic religious outlook, nurtured on such works as the Fellowship hymn book.

The descriptions varying from the almost feudal life of Tom Hughes's ancestors to the unemployed demonstrations between the two wars, which give Mary Hughes' life its significance, make this all too brief biographical sketch of quite exceptional historical interest.

SWANSEA. NEVILLE MASTERMAN.

ST BENEDICT. By T. F. Lindsay. Burns Oates. 10s. 6d.

The wrapper states that this book is "admirably suited to the general reader seeking to know something of the Saint's life, the times in which he lived, the religious institute he founded and its significance in the world to-day." This "non-controversial life of St Benedict . . . will be found useful both for those who want spiritual reading and for students of the period."

For a book of less than 200 pages this is to say a great deal. Anyone seeking spiritual reading will find an excellent life of the Saint drawn from St Gregory's Dialogues, and quotations from the "Rule" to illustrate the mind of St Benedict. But if he wishes to do this, he will have to select his chapters.

The student will find a capable analysis of the historical background, though it is too compressed for easy reading. Mr Lindsay states the case between Abbot Butler and Dom Chapman fairly, and does not hesitate to give his own opinion in conclusion on this and on other disputed points in Benedictine history. Probably the book will appeal most to students who are already familiar with the standard works on the Saint and his period. Mr Lindsay has succeeded in giving a clear précis of their more interesting conclusions. The book has an adequate index.

B. M. OMAN.

TUNBRIDGE WELLS.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.)

ABINGDON-COKESBURY PRESS (NASHVILLE): John Knox, *Chapters in a Life of Paul* ($2.50).

ALLEN AND UNWIN: Heinrich Heppe, *Reformed Dogmatics* (50s.).

BLACKWELL: A. S. T. Fisher, *The Prodigal Son* (A Poem) (2s.).

GEOFFREY BLES: O. F. Clarke, *Introduction to Berdyaev* (15s.).

BURNS OATES: J. Crehan, S.J., *Early Christian Baptism and the Creed* (21s.).

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS: Peter Katz, *Philo's Bible* (25s.).

CATHOLIC TRUTH SOCIETY: Cardinal Griffin, *The Catholic Church and Re-union* (3d.); Ronald Knox, *St Paul's Gospel* (1s.).

CHURCH BOOK ROOM PRESS: H. D. S. Sweetapple, *Our Goodly Heritage* (2s.); W. H. Griffith Thomas, *The Christian Life and How to Live It* (3s.).

CHURCH LITERATURE ASSOCIATION: Christopher Byron, *The Christian Ascent* (6d.).

T. AND T. CLARK: H. H. Rowley (Ed.), *Studies in Old Testament Prophecy* (16s.).

CLONMORE AND REYNOLDS: Thomas Hurley, S.J., *Father Michael Browne, S.J.* (12s. 6d.).

PETER HANSTEIN VERLAG (BONN): N. Monzel, *Die Überlieferung* (DM. 8.50).

HODDER AND STOUGHTON: William Neil, *Thessalonians* (The Moffat New Testament Commentary) (10s. 6d.); Cyril Garbett, *Church and State in England* (15s.); C. J. Wright, *Jesus the Revelation of God* (25s.).

HUTCHINSON: Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (12s. 6d.).

INDEPENDENT PRESS: L. H. Hough, *The Dignity of Man* (6s.); John Pitts, *Religion and the New Paganism* (8s. 6d.).

LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY PRESS: H. McLachlan (Ed.), *Sir Isaac Newton Theological Manuscripts* (7s. 6d.).

LUTTERWORTH PRESS: D. W. C. Ford, *Why Men Believe in Jesus Christ* (3s.).

MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS: Henry G. Meecham, *The Epistle to Diognetus* (18s.).

MOWBRAYS: M. V. C. Jeffreys, *Kingdom of This World* (6s.); G. H. Midgley, *For the Three Hours' Devotion* (2s.); W. H. Maxwell Rennie, *These Two Commandments* (9d.); P. Franklin Chambers, *An Anthology for Lent* (3s. 6d.); H. de Candole, *The Church's Prayers* (2s. 6d.).

NISBET: John H. S. Burleigh, *The City of God* (12s. 6d.).

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: Frank Barlow, *Durham Jurisdictional Peculiars* (12s. 6d.).

ROCKCLIFF: Nicodemus, *Fore Dawn* (10s. 6d.).

S.C.M. PRESS: Gilbert Hort, *The Meeting-place of God and Man* (4s. 6d.); William Temple, *Christianity and Social Order* [A reissue of the well-known Penguin book] (6s.).

SHEED AND WARD: H. van Zeller, O.S.B., *We Work While the Light Lasts* (7s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K.: Patrick Hankey, *Prosperous Error and Afflicted Truth* (9d.); R. F. Palmer, S.S.J.E., *At One* (2s. 9d.).

T.A.M. PRESS (TIRUVALLA, S. INDIA): K. N. Daniel, *A Critical Study of Primitive Liturgies* (2nd ed.) (12s.).

VANDENHOECK AND RUPRECHT (GÖTTINGEN): H. J. Iwand (Ed.), *Göttinger Predigtmeditationen: Die altkirchlichen Evangelien (Invokavit bis Exaudi)* (n.p.).

WILLIAMS AND NORGATE: Leslie S. R. Badham, *Verdict on Jesus* (9s. 6d.).

Printed in Great Britain by
Billing and Sons Ltd., Guildford and Esher